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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a Markov decision process (MDP), where the ego agent has a nominal objective to pursue while
needs to hide its state from detection by an adversary. After formulating the problem, we first propose a value iteration (VI)
approach to solve it. To overcome the “curse of dimensionality” and thus gain scalability to larger-sized problems, we then
propose a receding-horizon optimization (RHO) approach to obtain approximate solutions. We use examples to illustrate and
compare the VI and RHO approaches, and to show the potential of our problem formulation for practical applications.
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1 Introduction
Privacy is one of the ingredients of cyber-physical secu-
rity, and has been gaining increasing attention in the age
of cyber-physical systems and internet of things (Giraldo
et al., 2017). For a dynamic system, privacy often corre-
sponds to the observability/detectability of the system’s
state. In this paper, we consider privacy in the setting
of controlled stochastic dynamic systems represented as
Markov decision processes (MDPs) (Howard, 1960).
In particular, we consider the decision-making process
by an ego agent, who has a nominal objective to pur-
sue while needs to hide its state from detection by an
adversary. The detection by the adversary is through a
stochastic observation function. This observation func-
tion provides partial/imperfect information about the
ego agent’s current state, used by the adversary to infer
the value of the state. Specifically, the adversary’s in-
ference is, in general, a probability distribution on the
state space, characterizing the adversary’s degrees of be-
lieving that the current state is at each particular value.
In this setting, to avoid detection by the adversary is to
cause the adversary’s belief in the true state value to be
low.
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Such a problem setting corresponds to many real-world
situations. For example, an autonomous agent needs to
carry out a task in an adversarial environment. The
agent may want to hide its location from the adversary’s
sensing to protect itself from getting attacked.
Privacy for cyber-physical systems has been extensively
investigated in the context of discrete-event systems
(DES) (Lafortune, 2019). The notion in the language
of DES that is most similar to the one discussed in
this paper of avoiding detection by the adversary is
called “current-state opacity” (Jacob et al., 2016). A
DES is said to be current-state opaque if the adversary
cannot determine for sure that the system is currently
at a specific state/a specific set of states based on its
limited observation. Although the notion and verifica-
tion approaches of “current-state opacity” have been
recently extended to stochastic DES and to incorporate
the concept of possibilities of being detected (Saboori
and Hadjicostis, 2013), there are fundamental differ-
ences with the problem setting and solution approaches
discussed in this paper: 1) The dynamics of a DES
are typically event-triggered, while the dynamics of an
MDP are time-based. 2) The analysis and control syn-
thesis techniques in the context of DES are typically
based on constructions of automatons, while those in
the context of MDP, including the ones discussed in this
paper, are essentially based on optimal control theory,
e.g., dynamic programming.
In the context of MDP, a related problem is entropy
maximization (Biondi et al., 2014; Savas et al., 2018).
Preprint submitted to Automatica 22 August 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
07
69
1v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
1 A
ug
 20
19
The entropy of a distribution quantifies the uncertainty
of the event, and a larger entropy represents a higher de-
gree of unpredictability. Differently from entropy max-
imization, the problem considered in this paper is only
concerned with the value of the adversary’s belief in the
true state. For example, a belief distribution that as-
signs probability 1 to a specific value has the minimum
entropy 0, representing a deterministic prediction and
not being desired in entropy maximization. However, if
this specific value with probability 1 is not the true state
value, such a belief distribution is desired in our prob-
lem setting, as it represents a prediction of the adver-
sary that completely misses the ego agent’s true state
and thus is desired by the ego agent.
Another related problem is covariance control (Hotz and
Skelton, 1987; Chen et al., 2015). Similar to entropy, a
“larger” covariance represents a higher degree of uncer-
tainty. The same example as above can be used to illus-
trate the difference between covariance control and our
problem setting.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem discussed in
this paper has not been previously investigated in the
literature. The contributions of this paper include, in ad-
dition to the formulation of the detection-averse MDP,
the developments of a value iteration (VI) approach to
solve it and a receding-horizon optimization (RHO) ap-
proach, which has better scalability than the one based
on VI, to obtain approximate solutions. The proposed
problem formulation also has a potential for real-world
applications, which has been discussed above and will
also be illustrated through an example in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we introduce the problem formulation. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe an approach based on value iteration
to solve the problem. To overcome the “curse of dimen-
sionality” and gain scalability to larger-sized problems,
we propose an approach based on receding-horizon op-
timization to obtain approximate solutions in Section 4.
We then use two examples to illustrate the problem and
approaches in Section 5, and finally conclude the paper
in Section 6.
The notations used in this paper are standard. In par-
ticular, we use N to denote the set of natural numbers
(without 0), and N0 = N ∪ {0}. We use IΩ(ω) to denote
the indicator function, IΩ(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ Ω and IΩ(ω) = 0
otherwise, and Iω′(ω) = I{ω′}(ω).
2 Detection-averse Markov decision process
2.1 Markov decision process with nominal objective
We consider a finite-space Markov decision process
(MDP) for an ego agent represented by the following
time-invariant state transition kernel:
p(x′|x, u) := P(xt+1 = x′|xt = x, ut = u), ∀ t ∈ N0,
(1)
defined for all x, x′ ∈ X and u ∈ U , where X and U
represent, respectively, a finite state space and a finite
action space. In particular, it is assumed that the state
xt is fully observable by the ego agent.
The nominal decision-making objective of the ego agent
at time step t, for every nonnegative integer t ∈ N0,
is represented using the expected value of an infinite-
horizon discounted cumulative reward, as follows:
R(xt) := E
{ ∞∑
τ=0
λτR(xτ |t, uτ |t)
∣∣x0|t = xt}, (2)
where R : X × U → R is a stage reward function, and
λ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. By notation (·)τ |t, we
mean a predicted value of the variable (·)t+τ with the
prediction made at time step t.
When solely pursuing this nominal objective, the ego
agent maximizes (2) subject to the dynamics (1), i.e.,
max
pi
Rpi(xt), (3a)
s.t. p(x′|x, u), (3b)
where pi : X → U is a policy that maps states to actions,
and Rpi(xt) represents the value of (2) under the policy
pi, i.e., uτ |t = pi(xτ |t) for all τ ∈ N0.
It is well-known that the solution to (3) exists and satis-
fies the following Bellman equation (Theorems 6.2.6 and
6.2.10 of Puterman (1994)):
V (xt)
= max
u∈U
{
R(xt, u) + λE
{
V (x1|t)|x0|t = xt, u0|t = u
}}
,
= max
u∈U
{
R(xt, u) + λ
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|xt, u)V (x′)
}
, (4)
where V (x) := maxpi Rpi(x) can be determined by the
following value iteration:
V k+1(x) = max
u∈U
{
R(x, u) + λ
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, u)V k(x′)
}
,
(5)
which is convergent for all x ∈ X as k →∞.
Once V (x) is obtained, the optimal policy for the ego
agent under nominal decision-making objective, pi∗, can
be obtained by
pi∗(x) = arg max
u∈U
{
R(x, u) + λ
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, u)V (x′)
}
.
(6)
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In this paper, we assume that the optimal policy pi∗ is
unique. Such a uniqueness assumption for optimal poli-
cies of MDPs is often adopted in the literature (see Cruz-
Sua´rez et al. (2004) and references therein).
2.2 Adversarial detection
We consider a situation where an adversary is trying to
detect the state of the ego agent, in particular, through
the following observation kernel:
q(y|x) := P(yt = y|xt = x), ∀ t ∈ N0, (7)
defined for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , where Y represents a
finite observation space. It is assumed that the observa-
tion yt is conditionally independent of all other variables
given xt. In addition, we make the following assumptions
about the adversary: 1) The adversary cannot observe
the ego agent’s action ut applied at every time step. How-
ever, 2) the adversary knows the state transition kernel
(1) and the ego agent’s nominal objective function (2).
The above assumptions are reasonable in many applica-
tions. On the one hand, the information asymmetry that
the ego agent can fully observe its own state xt and action
ut while the adversary can only obtain partial informa-
tion yt exists in many situations, e.g., in cases where xt
includes some internal states of the ego agent that can-
not be observed from the outside. Such an assumption
of information asymmetry also distinguishes our prob-
lem setting from the one considered in Hibbard et al.
(2019), where the ego agent and the adversary share the
same partial observability and observation kernel. On
the other hand, the transition kernel (1) and the nomi-
nal objective (2) may be public knowledge, thus known
by both the ego agent and the adversary.
Although not being able to observe ut, based on the
knowledge of (1) and (2), the adversary can infer the ego
agent’s actions ut through solving its nominal decision-
making problem (3).
Once pi∗ is obtained, the evolution of the state xt obeys
the following Markov chain induced from (1) and pi∗ in
the eyes of the adversary:
pa(x
′|x) := P(xt+1 = x′|xt = x, ut = pi∗(x)), ∀ t ∈ N0,
(8)
defined for all x, x′ ∈ X.
Based on (8), the adversary can infer the state xt, more
specifically, the posterior belief of xt with all available
observations, ξt = {y0, · · · , yt}, taken into account, ac-
cording to the following recursive Bayesian inference for-
mula (Chen et al., 2003):
o(x′|ξt) := P(xt = x′|y0, · · · , yt)
=
P(xt = x′, yt|y0, · · · , yt−1)
P(yt|y0, · · · , yt−1)
=
P(yt|y0, · · · , yt−1, xt = x′)P(xt = x′|y0, · · · , yt−1)∑
x′′∈X P(xt = x′′, yt|y0, · · · , yt−1)
=
P(yt|xt = x′)
∑
x∈X P(xt = x′, xt−1 = x|y0, · · · , yt−1)∑
x′′∈X P(yt|xt = x′′)P(xt = x′′|y0, · · · , yt−1)
=
q(yt|x′)
∑
x∈X P(xt = x′|y0, · · · , yt−1, xt−1 = x)o(x|ξt−1)∑
x′′∈X q(yt|x′′)
∑
x∈X P(xt = x′′, xt−1 = x|y0, · · · , yt−1)
=
q(yt|x′)
∑
x∈X pa(x
′|x)o(x|ξt−1)∑
x′′∈X q(yt|x′′)
∑
x∈X pa(x′′|x)o(x|ξt−1)
. (9)
For convenience, we define the recursive Bayesian infer-
ence operator associated with the transition kernel pa,
Ba : ∆× Y → ∆, where ∆ := {o ∈ [0, 1]|X| | ‖o‖`1 = 1}
is the (|X| − 1)-dimensional probability simplex, as fol-
lows:
(Ba(o, y))(x′) = q(y|x′)∑x∈X pa(x′|x)o(x)∑
x′′∈X q(y|x′′)
∑
x∈X pa(x′′|x)o(x)
.
(10)
2.3 Decision-making with anti-detection objective
We further consider the situation where the ego agent is
aware of the existence of such an adversary and another
objective of its decision-making is to hide from the ad-
versary’s detection.
In particular, we make the following assumptions: 1) The
adversary is unaware of this anti-detection objective of
the ego agent, so the adversary infers xt still relying on
(8) and (9). 2) The information leaked to the adversary,
yt, is known by the ego agent. And, 3) the previous belief
of the adversary, o(x|ξt−1), is also known by the ego
agent.
The assumptions 1) and 2) represent many real-world
situations. The assumption 3) is also reasonable: the ego
agent can start with a sufficiently nice initial prior (sat-
isfying the Cromwell’s rule (Jackman, 2009)), which is
not necessarily identical to that of the adversary, e.g., a
uniform distribution over X; then, the ego agent can re-
cursively update the posterior belief associated with its
own initial prior using (9); by the Bernstein–von Mises
theorem (van der Vaart, 2000), the posterior belief is ef-
fectively asymptotically independent of the prior – the
ego agent’s posterior belief will asymptotically converge
to that of the adversary, and thus, after a sufficient num-
ber of time steps, the assumption 3) is approximately
satisfied.
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Based on the above assumptions, the ego agent can pre-
dict the adversary’s future inferences using (9).
The extent of detection by the adversary can be mea-
sured by
C
(
xt, o(·|ξt)
)
:= o(xt|ξt) =
∑
x∈X
o(x|ξt)Ix(xt), (11)
where xt is the true value of the state. Using this mea-
sure, it makes no difference to the ego agent whether the
distribution o(·|ξt) on X is “flat” or has “peaks” at some
x ∈ X as long as x 6= xt. This measure distinguishes
our problem formulation from others, e.g., entropy or
covariance maximization.
The anti-detection objective of the ego agent can then
be represented using the following penalty function:
C(xt, o(·|ξt)) = (12)
E
{ ∞∑
τ=0
λτC
(
xτ |t, o(·|ξτ |t)
)∣∣x0|t = xt, o(·|ξ0|t) = o(·|ξt)}.
Remark 1: By notation o(·|ξt), we mean a specific se-
quence of observations ξt = {y0, · · · , yt}. Based on (9)
and (11), we have the following two observations: 1)
The dynamics of o(·|ξt) have the Markov property, i.e.,
o(·|ξt+1) is conditionally independent of o(·|ξt−k), k ∈ N,
given o(·|ξt). In particular, o(·|ξt+1) is uniquely deter-
mined by o(·|ξt) and yt+1. 2) In general, it is possible that
o(·|ξt, y1t+1) = o(·|ξt, y2t+1) for y1t+1 6= y2t+1. However,
the penalty only depends on the value of o(·|ξt, y1t+1) =
o(·|ξt, y2t+1) rather than on which observation y1t+1 or
y2t+1 is realized. Together with 1), it can be immediately
seen that, on the one hand, the values of the posterior
beliefs o(·|ξτ |t) have influences on the value of (12), while
on the other hand, the observations yτ |t are just inter-
mediate variables to propagate the posterior beliefs. To
represent this fact and also simplify the notations, we
use ot to denote the posterior belief at time step t, which
can also be viewed as the equivalence class of o(·|ξt) with
the equivalence relation defined by o(·|ξ1t ) ∼ o(·|ξ2t ) if
o(·|ξ1t ) = o(·|ξ2t ) where ξ1t and ξ2t denote any two differ-
ent observation sequences.
Using the notation ot, we formulate the decision-making
problem of the ego agent when solely pursuing the anti-
detection objective as:
min
pia
Cpia(xt, ot), (13)
where pia : X × ∆ → U is a policy such that uτ |t =
pia(xτ |t, oτ |t) for all τ ∈ N0, and
C(xt, ot) = E{ ∞∑
τ=0
λτC
(
xτ |t, oτ |t
)∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot},
C
(
xt, ot
)
=
∑
x∈X
ot(x)Ix(xt), (14)
subject to a transition kernel representing the dynamics
of (xt, ot, ut)→ (xt+1, ot+1).
Note that ot is a distribution on a finite set represented
using a vector in ∆, in particular, ot takes continuous
values. Thus, the transition kernel for (xt, ot) cannot
be represented using a time-invariant transition matrix
as can be done for (1). Fortunately, it admits a closed-
form expression using the recursive Bayesian inference
operator Ba defined in (10) as follows:
r(x′, o′|x, o, u)
:= P
(
xt+1 = x
′, ot+1 = o′
∣∣xt = x, ot = o, ut = u)
=
∑
y∈Y
P
(
xt+1 = x
′, ot+1 = o′,
yt+1 = y
∣∣xt = x, ot = o, ut = u)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
P
(
ot+1 = o
′∣∣ot = o, yt+1 = y)·
· P(yt+1 = y∣∣xt+1 = x′)P(xt+1 = x′∣∣xt = x, ut = u))
=
∑
y∈Y
(
IBa(o,y)(o
′) q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u)
)
. (15)
Lemma 1: Given a 3-tuple (x, o, u) ∈ X × ∆ × U , the
r(·, ·|x, o, u) defined by (15) is either ill-defined or a dis-
crete probability measure on X×∆ with finite support.
Proof: Note that the recursive Bayesian inference oper-
ator Ba defined by (10) is ill-defined for (o, y) ∈ ∆ × Y
such that q(y|x′)∑x∈X pa(x′|x)o(x) = 0 for all x′ ∈ X
(causing 00 ). Consequently, the r(·, ·|x, o, u) defined by
(15) is ill-defined for (x, o, u) ∈ X × ∆ × U such that
there exists y ∈ Y with∑x′∈X q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u) > 0 and
Ba being ill-defined for (o, y) ∈ ∆× Y .
When r(·, ·|x, o, u) is well-defined, for each x′ ∈ X,
there are at most |Y | different points o′ ∈ ∆ with
r(x′, o′|x, o, u) being non-zero. This fact follows from the
term IBa(o,y)(o′) in (15) and the fact thatBa : ∆×Y → ∆
is a deterministic operator. Thus, due to the finiteness
of X × Y , r(·, ·|x, o, u) has finite support on X ×∆. It
is also clear from (15) that r(·, ·|x, o, u) is non-negative.
Then, it remains to show that
∫
X×∆ dr(·, ·|x, o, u) =
4
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆ r(x
′, o′|x, o, u) = 1. 1 This holds since
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆
r(x′, o′|x, o, u)
=
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆
∑
y∈Y
(
IBa(o,y)(o
′) q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u)
)
(16)
=
∑
x′∈X
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
o′∈∆
IBa(o,y)(o
′) q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u)
)
(17)
=
∑
x′∈X
∑
y∈Y
q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u) =
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, u) = 1,
where Tonelli’s theorem enables us to switch the order
of the summation and obtain (17) from (16). Therefore,
r(·, ·|x, o, u) is a discrete probability measure on X ×∆
with finite support. 
Remark 2: The fact that the recursive Bayesian inference
operator Ba is ill-defined for pairs (o, y) ∈ ∆ × Y with∑
x′∈X q(y|x′)
∑
x∈X pa(x
′|x)o(x) = 0 is not a problem
for traditional applications of Bayesian estimation, e.g.,
in the settings of hidden Markov models and partially
observable MDPs, because such (o, y) pairs can almost
never, i.e., with probability 0, occur. However, in our
setting, due to the possibility for the ego agent’s action
ut = u to be different from the adversary’s prediction
ut = pi
∗(xt), such (ot, yt+1) = (o, y) may occur. Physi-
cally, this represents a case where the adversary observes
an observation yt+1 = y that can almost never occur if
the ego agent applies the policy pi∗. This may shock the
adversary and let it become aware of the ego agent’s anti-
detection behavior, which may be undesirable. There-
fore, the occurrence of such cases should be avoided. The
way to avoid it will be discussed in detail in Section 3.
To account for both the nominal objective (2) and the
objective of anti-detection (12), two different strategies
can be pursued: The first strategy is to treat one of (2)
and (12) as the objective function to optimize and im-
pose a constraint representing the requirement that the
value of the other has to be higher/lower than a specified
threshold (Savas et al., 2018; Hibbard et al., 2019). In
this paper, we pursue another strategy, i.e., to optimize
a convex combination of (2) and (12). In particular, we
consider the following decision-making process:
max
pia
wnRpia(xt)− wa Cpia(xt, ot), (18a)
s.t. r(x′, o′|x, o, u), (18b)
where wn, wa ∈ [0,∞) are weighting factors that bal-
ance the considerations of nominal and anti-detection
objectives.
1 Most generally, the sum
∑
o′∈∆ can be defined as∑
o′∈∆ := sup
{∑
o′∈∆′ |∆′ ⊂ ∆ is finite
}
.
A side observation is that when wa < 0, (18) is increas-
ing the probability of being detected instead of decreas-
ing it. Such a formulation may be useful in the context
of information collection in partially observable environ-
ments.
3 Solution approach based on value iteration
In this section, we describe a value iteration (VI) ap-
proach to solve the problem (18).
Note that, given a pair (x, o), u must take its value
in Ua(x, o) = U \ Up(x, o) for the well-definedness of
r(·, ·|x, o, u), where the set of prohibited actions Up(x, o)
is defined as follows (see proof of Lemma 1):
Up(x, o) :={
u ∈ U | ∃ y ∈ Y s.t.
∑
x′∈X
q(y|x′) p(x′|x, u) > 0
and
∑
x′′∈X
q(y|x′′)( ∑
x′∈X
pa(x
′′|x′)o(x′)) = 0}. (19)
We are now ready to present the main result of this
section:
Theorem 1: Assume that Ua(x, o) 6= ∅ for all (x, o) ∈
X ×∆. 2 Then, the solution to (18) over the set of ad-
missible policies, Πa, satisfying pia(x, o) ∈ Ua(x, o) for
all (x, o) ∈ X×∆, exists and satisfies the following Bell-
man equation:
Va(xt, ot) = max
u∈Ua(xt,ot)
{(
wnR(xt, u)− wa C(xt, ot)
)
+ λE
{
Va(x1|t, o1|t)
∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot, u0|t = u}},
= max
u∈Ua(xt,ot)
{(
wnR(xt, u)− wa C(xt, ot)
)
+ λ
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆
(
r(x′, o′|xt, ot, u)Va(x′, o′)
)}
, (20)
where Va(x, o) := maxpia∈Πa wnRpia(x) − wa Cpia(x, o)
can be determined by the following value iteration:
V k+1a (x, o) = max
u∈Ua(x,o)
{(
wnR(x, u)− wa C(x, o)
)
+ λ
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆
(
r(x′, o′|x, o, u)V ka (x′, o′)
)}
, (21)
as k →∞. Note that the sum of r(x′, o′|x, o, u)Va(x′, o′)
over X × ∆ is finite by the fact that r(·, ·|x, o, u) has
finite support.
2 Supported by Lemma 2 in Appendix.
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Once Va(x, o) is obtained, the optimal policy for the
ego agent under weighted nominal and anti-detection
decision-making objectives, pi∗a, can be obtained by
pi∗a(x, o) = arg max
u∈Ua(x,o)
{(
wnR(x, u)− wa C(x, o)
)
+ λ
∑
x′∈X
∑
o′∈∆
(
r(x′, o′|x, o, u)Va(x′, o′)
)}
. (22)
Proof: Note that the following properties hold for (18):
1) For each state (x, o) ∈ X × ∆, the set Ua(x, o) of
admissible actions (non-empty by assumption) is finite,
thus, compact.
2) Since the reward R : X × U → R is defined on a
finite space and the penalty C : X × ∆ → R takes
values in [0, 1], the wnR − wa C is bounded on the set
of admissible state-action pairs
{(
(x, o), u
)∣∣(x, o) ∈ X×
∆, u ∈ Ua(x, o)
}
. Moreover, for each (x, o) ∈ X × ∆,
wnR(x, ·) − wa C(x, o) is a continuous function of u ∈
Ua(x, o), which is trivial since Ua(x, o) is finite/discrete.
3) For each (x, o) ∈ X × ∆ and v ∈ L∞(X ×
∆) 3 ,
∫
X×∆ v(x
′, o′) dr(x′, o′|x, o, ·) = ∑x′∈X∑o′∈∆(
v(x′, o′) r(x′, o′|x, o, ·)) is a continuous function of
u ∈ Ua(x, o), which is trivial, again, due to the finiteness
of Ua(x, o).
Then, the statements of Theorem 1 follow from Theo-
rem 2.2 and Remark 2.3 of Herna´ndez-Lerma (2012). 
Since o ∈ ∆ takes continuous values, to numerically op-
erate the value iteration (21) requires functional approx-
imation techniques. In practice, we discretize the space
∆, update the values of V k+1a (x, o) on the grid points,
during which we obtain the values of V ka (x
′, o′) through
interpolation.
Note also that we need not characterize the set (19)
beforehand, but can identify the events u ∈//∈ Up(x, o)
when computing r(x′, o′|x, o, u) (defined in (15)) in the
course of evaluating (21) or (22).
4 Approximate solution approach based on
receding-horizon optimization
The value iteration approach (21) to solving (18) suffers
from the “curse of dimensionality.” In particular, simi-
larly to the situation in partially observable MDPs, as
the number of states x ∈ X increases, the dimension of
3 L∞(X × ∆) denotes the Banach space of real-valued
bounded measurable functions on X×∆ with the sup-norm
‖v‖ := sup(x,o) |v(x, o)|.
the posterior belief vector o ∈ ∆ ⊂ [0, 1]|X| increases.
Consequently, the value iteration becomes computation-
ally challenging when the finite state space X becomes
larger.
To handle problems of larger size, we propose a receding-
horizon approximation to (18) as follows:
max
µ0:N−1, pi
wn (R1 +R2)− (wa + w′a)R3, (23a)
s.t. r(x′, o′|x, o, u), (23b)
where
R1 = E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR(xτ |t, uτ |t)
∣∣x0|t = xt,
{uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1
}
,
R2 = E
{ ∞∑
τ=N
λτR(xτ |t, uτ |t)
∣∣x0|t = xt,
{uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1, uτ |t = pi(xτ |t), ∀ τ ≥ N
}
,
R3 = E
{N−1∑
τ=1
λτC(xτ |t, oτ |t)
∣∣x0|t = xt,
o0|t = ot, {uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1
}
. (24)
Note that in defining R3 we do not include the term
λτC(xτ |t, oτ |t) associated with τ = 0 as it is a constant
and does not change the maximizers.
The approximation (23) is to use open-loop actions
µ0:N−1 = {µ0, µ1, · · · , µN−1} to control the ego agent
for the first N steps over the horizon, then switch to
closed-loop policy pi : X → U for the remaining horizon.
In particular, wnR1 − waR3 represents the expected
value of the cumulative reward over the first N steps,∑N−1
τ=0 λ
τ
(
wnR(xτ |t, uτ |t) − waC(xτ |t, oτ |t)
)
(up to a
constant); R2 represents the expected value of the cu-
mulative reward associated with the nominal objective
over the remaining horizon; and finally, w′aR3 repre-
sents an estimate of the cumulative penalty associated
with the anti-detection objective over the remaining
horizon based on that over the first N steps, where w′a is
a tuning parameter suggested to be picked in the range[
0, λ
N
1−λN wa
]
.
After solving (23), the ego agent applies µ0 as the action
for time step t, i.e., ut = µ0. Once the state has been
updated from xt to xt+1, the ego agent repeats the same
procedure at the next time step t+ 1.
Theorem 2: Problem (23) can be equivalently 4 simpli-
4 In terms of maintaining the maximizers µ0:N−1 to be the
same as those for (23).
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fied to
max
µ0:N−1
wn (R1 +R∗2)− (wa + w′a)R3, (25a)
s.t. r(x′, o′|x, o, u), (25b)
with
R∗2 = λN
∑
x∈X
(
V (x)· (26)
· P(xN |t = x∣∣x0|t = xt, {uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1)),
where V (x) is the value function defined in (4) and has
been computed when solving (3).
Proof: Note that 1) R1 and R3 are independent of pi,
and 2) using the Markov property of the dynamics of x,
R2 can be written as
R2 =
∑
x∈X
(
E
{ ∞∑
τ=N
λτR(xτ |t, uτ |t)
∣∣xN |t = x,
uτ |t = pi(xτ |t), ∀ τ ≥ N
}
P
(
xN |t = x
∣∣x0|t = xt,
{uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1
))
= λN
∑
x∈X
(
E
{ ∞∑
τ=0
λτR(xτ |t, uτ |t)
∣∣x0|t = x,
uτ |t = pi(xτ |t), ∀ τ ≥ 0
}
P
(
xN |t = x
∣∣x0|t = xt,
{uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1
))
(27)
= λN
∑
x∈X
(
Rpi(x)·
· P(xN |t = x∣∣x0|t = xt, {uτ |t}N−1τ=0 = µ0:N−1)).
Then, based on Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bell-
man, 2003), the optimal policy pi to problem (23) agrees
with the optimal solution to (3), and the statement of
Theorem 2 follows. 
Problem (25) is a finite-horizon (N -step look-ahead)
open-loop decision-making problem with a finite deci-
sion set, and can be solved online using a tree-search
method. Note that at each prediction step, only a finite
number of values for the pair (x′, o′) needs to be ac-
counted for, due to the fact that, given (x, o), r(·, ·|x, o, u)
has finite support for each u. In particular, for any ac-
tion sequence µ0:N−1, R1, R∗2, and R3 can be evaluated
according to (26) and the following (28) (29),
R1 =
N−1∑
τ=0
λτ
(∑
x∈X
R(x, µτ )P
(
xτ |t = x
∣∣x0|t = xt,
{uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1
))
, (28)
R3 =
N−1∑
τ=1
λτ
(∑
x∈X
∑
o∈∆
C(x, o)P
(
(xτ |t, oτ |t) = (x, o)
∣∣
x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot, {uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1
))
, (29)
where for every τ = 1, · · · , N ,
P
(
(xτ |t, oτ |t) = (x′, o′)
∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot,
{uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1
)
=∑
x∈X
∑
o∈∆
P
(
(xτ |t, oτ |t) = (x′, o′), (xτ−1|t, oτ−1|t) =
(x, o)
∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot, {uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1) =∑
x∈X
∑
o∈∆
r(x′, o′|x, o, µτ−1)P
(
(xτ−1|t, oτ−1|t) =
(x, o)
∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot, {uk|t}τ−2k=0 = µ0:τ−2), (30)
computed recursively, and
P
(
xτ |t = x
∣∣x0|t = xt, {uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1)
=
∑
o∈∆
P
(
(xτ |t, oτ |t) = (x, o)
∣∣x0|t = xt, o0|t = ot,
{uk|t}τ−1k=0 = µ0:τ−1
)
. (31)
5 Examples
5.1 Example 1
We consider an MDP model with X = {1, 2, 3} and
U = {1, 2}, as follows:
p1 =

0.8 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , p2 =

0.1 0.1 0.8
0.8 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1
 , (32)
where pkij = p(i|j, k); the nominal reward function (2) is
with
R(x, u) = I1(x) + 0.8 I2(x), λ = 0.95; (33)
and the observation kernel of the adversary is
q =

0.7 0.1 0.05
0.15 0.45 0.05
0.15 0.45 0.9
 , (34)
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where qij = q(i|j).
We use, respectively, the policy pi∗ obtained by solving
(3), the policy pi∗a obtained by solving (18), and the on-
line determined actions µ∗0 from (25) with N = 3 and
w′a = 0 to control the ego agent, and we run closed-loop
simulations for different combinations of wn and wa.
We plot the average reward achieved by the ego agent
r¯(t) = 1t+1
∑t
k=0R(xk, uk) and the average extent of
detection by the adversary o¯(t) = 1t+1
∑t
k=0 o(xk|ξk)
during the simulation for each case in Figs. 1 and
2, where the blue solid curves correspond to pi∗, the
red, green, magenta solid curves correspond to pi∗a
with (wn, wa) = (0, 1), (0.5, 0.5), (0,−1), and the red,
green, magenta dotted curves correspond to µ∗0 with
(wn, wa) = (0, 1), (0.5, 0.5), (0,−1).
It can be observed that for (wn, wa) = (0, 1), i.e., the ego
agent only caring about anti-detection, the extent of de-
tection measured by o¯(t) is maintained to be low using
either the offline constructed policy pi∗a or the online de-
termined actions µ∗0, in particular, much lower as com-
pared to the nominal policy pi∗. However, the nominal
reward r¯(t) is also very low, representing an unsatisfac-
tory behavior in terms of executing the nominal mission.
For (wn, wa) = (0.5, 0.5), with a small sacrifice in the
nominal reward r¯(t) (less than 0.1), the ego agent can
reduce the extent of detection o¯(t) by a considerable
amount (more than 0.15) 5 .
For (wn, wa) = (0,−1), i.e., the ego agent maximizing
the extent of detection, the resulting o¯(t) is higher than
that corresponding to the nominal policy pi∗, while the
nominal reward r¯(t) is close to that of pi∗, representing
the fact that, for most time instants, the action maxi-
mizing the extent of detection agrees with the one gen-
erated from the nominal policy pi∗.
Furthermore, it can be observed that the receding-
horizon solutions from (25) approximate the policy pi∗a
satisfactorily, since their performance in terms of r¯(t)
and o¯(t) are close.
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µ
∗
0, (wn, wa) = (0,−1)
Fig. 1. Example 1: Time history of average reward.
5 Note that the maximum achievable decrease in o¯(t) is
about 0.3.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
o¯
pi
∗
n
pi
∗
a, (wn, wa) = (0, 1)
µ
∗
0, (wn, wa) = (0, 1)
pi
∗
a, (wn, wa) = (0.5, 0.5)
µ
∗
0, (wn, wa) = (0.5, 0.5)
pi
∗
a, (wn, wa) = (0,−1)
µ
∗
0, (wn, wa) = (0,−1)
Fig. 2. Example 1: Time history of average extent of detec-
tion.
5.2 Example 2
The second example we consider represents a path plan-
ning problem for an ego agent in a grid world, where,
in addition to reaching a target location, the ego agent
wants to hide its location from detection by a radar sen-
sor.
The initial and target locations of the ego agent, and the
location of the sensor are marked, respectively, by blue,
green, and red on the map (Fig. 3). It is assumed that the
sensor can measure the distance in `1-norm between the
ego agent and itself, where the measurement is corrupted
by discretized Gaussian noise.
In this example, due to the large state space X (|X| =
121), the computation load associated with the value
iteration approach (18) is heavy. Thus, we apply the
receding-horizon optimization approach (25) to solve
this problem.
It can be observed from Figs. 4 and 5 that by executing
the mission along a sub-optimal path in terms of the
nominal reward, the ego agent can significantly reduce
the extent of detection by the radar sensor.
Fig. 3. Example 2: Map of the grid world. The blue, green,
and red grid squares denote, respectively, the initial and
target locations of the ego agent, and the location of the
sensor.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we defined the detection-averse optimal
control problem for Markov decision processes. A value
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Fig. 4. Example 2: Contour of the value function V (x), and
the paths traversed by the ego agent when solely pursuing
the nominal objective (in red dotted) and when pursuing
both the nominal and the anti-detection objectives (in green
solid).
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o¯
Fig. 5. Example 2: Time histories of average extent of de-
tection when solely pursuing the nominal objective (in red
dotted) and when pursuing both the nominal and the an-
ti-detection objectives (in green solid).
iteration approach and a receding-horizon optimization
approach were proposed to solve the problem, where the
latter had a better scalablity to larger-sized problems.
Two examples were reported to illustrate the two ap-
proaches and the potential of the problem formulation
for practical applications.
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Appendix
Lemma 2: For any (x, o) ∈ X × ∆ such that o(x) > 0,
Ua(x, o) 6= ∅.
Proof: Suppose o(x)>0. For any y ∈ Y , if∑x′∈X q(y|x′)
p(x′|x, pi∗(x)) = ∑x′∈X q(y|x′) pa(x′|x) > 0, then∑
x′′∈X q(y|x′′)
(∑
x′∈X pa(x
′′|x′)o(x′)) ≥ ∑x′′∈X
q(y|x′′)pa(x′′|x)o(x) > 0. Thus, u = pi∗(x) ∈ Ua(x, o).
Lemma 2 verifies that for an arbitrary model (p, q, pa),
the set Ua(x, o) of admissible actions may only be empty
at the points (x, o) ∈ X × ∆ where o(x) = 0, which
represent a null set of the space X ×∆.
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